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Abstract
A recent review of empirical estimates of the elasticity of taxable income
(ETI) concluded that ‘the US marginal top rate is far from the top of the Laﬀer
curve’ (Saez et al, 2012, p.42). This paper provides a detailed examination of
the analysis underlying this conclusion, and considers whether other tax rates in
the US income tax system are on the ‘right’ side of the Laﬀer curve. Conceptual
expressions for ‘Laﬀer-maximum’ or revenue-maximizing ETIs, based on readily
observable parameters, are presented for individuals and groups of taxpayers in a
multi-rate income tax system. Applying these to the US income tax in 2005, with
its complex eﬀective marginal rate structure, demonstrates that a wide range of
revenue-maximizing ETI values can be expected for individual taxpayers within
and across tax brackets, and in aggregate. For many taxpayers these revenue-
maximizing ETIs are well within the range of empirically estimated elasticities.
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1 Introduction
Discussions of tax revenues and rates are often framed in terms of the well-known Laﬀer
curve, in which total tax revenue is related to the tax rate, within a tax system which
is implicitly thought of as having a single constant marginal rate. In this case, revenue
changes in proportion to taxable income and an economy is on the ‘wrong’ side of the
Laﬀer curve if the elasticity of taxable income with respect to the tax rate,  , is less
than minus one.
Expressed in terms of the aggregate ‘Feldstein’ elasticity of taxable income (ETI)
with respect to a proportionate change in the net-of-tax rate, 1− , this translates into
an ETI greater than (1− ) (Goolsbee, 1999; Hall, 1999). Hence, for a tax rate up
to 0.5, an elasticity of taxable income with respect to the net-of-tax rate greater than
one is required before a revenue-negative response to a tax rate increase occurs. It is
in this context that Saez et al. (2012, p.42) conclude, for the top marginal tax rate,
that ‘the most reliable longer-run estimates range from 0.12 to 0.4, suggesting that the
U.S. marginal top rate is far from the top of the Laﬀer curve’.
In practice income tax structures typically have numerous marginal rates, and there
are income ranges which reflect rate progression (an increasing marginal rate) or re-
ductions in eﬀective tax rates where means-tested benefit payments or tax credits, such
as the US earned income tax credit, are subject to abatement or taper rates. As a re-
sult, there is no single elasticity of taxable income that applies to all individuals at all
income levels.1 This raises the question of whether, or under what circumstances, esti-
mates of the elasticity of taxable income for taxpayers across the full range of incomes
and marginal rates can be expected to exceed values which generate revenue-reducing
responses to marginal tax rate changes.
The present paper seeks to answer this question by first establishing, in the context
of a multi-rate income tax, expressions for the elasticity of taxable income, at any
income level, above which an increase in the relevant marginal tax rate produces a
decrease in tax revenue. This elasticity, consistent with the maximum point on the
Laﬀer curve, is referred to below as the revenue-maximizing elasticity of taxable income,
ETI. It is shown that it can take a wide range of values both for individuals and for
1It is also likely to vary as the costs of income shifting, the ability to conceal income and the
chances of being detected by the tax authories, the ability to change hours of work in the short and
long run, and so on, vary.
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groups of taxpayers such as those facing particular marginal tax rates.2
Establishing the values of revenue-maximizing ETIs is important because, despite
the large number of empirical studies, it has proved diﬃcult to obtain reliable estimates
of the elasticity of taxable income, even where the focus of attention has been specific
sub-sets of taxpayers such as those at the top of the income distribution.3 The analysis
in this paper suggests that, even if the Saez et al. (2012) conclusion above is correct
on average for taxpayers in the top tax bracket, low ETI values appear relevant for
many who pay the top marginal tax rate. More generally, low estimated ETIs are quite
consistent with revenue-reducing responses by many taxpayers across wide ranges on
incomes.
Saez et al. (2012) and Giertz (2009b) addressed a diﬀerent but related question,
focusing mainly on the top tax bracket; namely, for alternative assumptions regarding
the ETI, how high is the revenue-maximizing tax rate? Saez et al. (2012) provide
suitable, simple expressions for the revenue-maximizing top tax rate, based on an
assumed Pareto distribution of upper tail incomes. Using this approach applied to
the 2005 US income tax and IRS taxable income data, Giertz (2009b) estimated the
revenue-maximizing top rate between 41% and 78% with assumed ETIs of 10 and 02
respectively.4
Furthermore, Werning (2007), Saez et al. (2012) and others have argued that the
set of welfare-improving tax reforms is closely related to whether an increase in a
particular marginal tax rate is expected to produce an increase in revenue of some
minimum amount. Werning (2007), for example, demonstrates that for a tax reform to
generate a Pareto superior tax structure, it is required to reduce all tax rates but yield
the same or more revenue overall, even though some taxpayers may respond in ways
that reduce revenue while others’ responses enhance revenues. Hence, Pareto eﬃciency
requires the tax system to be on the revenue-increasing side of the Laﬀer curve.5
2Saez et al. (2009, p. 5) provide an expression for the revenue change due to behavioural responses
to a change in the top tax rates.
3See Goolsbee (1999) for a detailed critique of the elasticity of taxable income concept and empirical
estimates, and Giertz (2007, 2009a,b) and Saez et al. (2012) for discussions of recent estimates and
reviews of related literature.
4For lower tax brackets, Giertz (2009b) reports even higher revenue-maximizing tax rates, generally
in the range 0.58 to 0.97 for the two lowest federal income tax brackets (10% and 15%) and 0.31 to
0.69 for the other three tax brackets (25%, 28% and 33%). All estimates are obtained from assumed
ETIs between 0.2 and 1.0.
5Trabandt and Uhlig (2010) attempt to assess empirically how far the existing systems of labour
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This paper shows that identifying the revenue-increasing side of the Laﬀer curve in
this context is more complex than simply establishing where the elasticity of taxable
income with respect to the tax rate equals minus one. However, the key components
of the revenue-maximizing elasticity of taxable income can be calculated using only
the details of the eﬀective marginal tax rates and income thresholds describing the
complete structure. Furthermore, with information on the complete distribution of
taxable income, revenue-maximizing ETI values at aggregate levels or for sub-sets of
taxpayers can be obtained.
The next section provides the relevant conceptual expressions for the revenue-
maximizing elasticity in a multi-rate system, applicable to individual taxpayers and
in aggregate. Section 3 then illustrates values for individual taxpayers based on the
US Federal and state income tax systems which, via an array of deductions and tax
credits subject to abatement, feature a multitude of eﬀective marginal tax rates across
a wide range of taxable income levels. Values for groups of taxpayers in aggregate
are analysed in section 4. Section 5 turns briefly to the question explored by Giertz
(2009b) and considers the revenue-maximizing marginal tax rate for each tax bracket,
for given values of the elasticity of taxable income. Brief conclusions are in section 6.
2 The ETI in Multi-rate Tax Structures
This section demonstrates, at the individual and aggregate levels, how the elasticity
of individual or aggregate tax with respect to a bracket’s marginal rate depends on
characteristics of the tax structure, the relevant elasticity of taxable income, and (for
aggregate values) the income distribution. For convenience, the distinction between
gross income and taxable income is ignored, though this distinction is likely to be
important where there are extensive income tax deductions.6 Where there are endoge-
nous, income-related deductions, the following analysis must be in terms of income
after deductions have been made, as in the case of the illustrations in section 3 below.
and capital income taxation in the US and a sample of European countries are on the ‘wrong’ side
of the Laﬀer curve. Only the capital income taxes of Sweden and Denmark appear to fall into this
category. See Trabandt and Uhlig (2012) for an update.
6For discussion of the empirical importance of income-related deductions in personal income tax
regimes in OECD countries, see Caminada and Goudswaard (1996) and Wagstaﬀ and van Doorslaer
(2001). For the US, Feldstein (1999, p. 675) estimated that total income tax deductions in 1993
amounted to about 60 per cent of estimated taxable income.
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In modelling revenue responses the analysis concentrates only on income tax, mak-
ing no allowance for possible shifting to other lower-taxed income sources such as
through incorporation or other tax-favoured entities. An analysis of total tax revenue
responses would also need to consider consumption taxes: to the extent that taxable
income reductions following income tax increases reflect real rather than shifting re-
sponses, consumption will also fall.
2.1 Eﬀective Income Thresholds
The multi-step tax function depends on a set of income threshold,    , and a
corresponding set of marginal tax rates   . These rates and thresholds can
represent the statutory income tax schedule, or the ‘eﬀective’ schedule of eﬀective
marginal rates and thresholds associated with the overall system of income taxes and
transfers.7
The tax paid by individual  with income of ,denoted  (), can be written as:
 () =  1 ( − 1) 1   ≤ 2
=  1 (2 − 1) +  2 ( − 2) 2   ≤ 3 (1)
and so on. If  falls into the th tax bracket, so that    ≤ +1  () can be
expressed for  ≥ 2 as:
 () =  ( − ) +
−1X
=1
  (+1 − )
=  ( − ∗) (2)
where:
∗ = 1
X
=1
 (  −  −1) (3)
and  0 = 0. Thus the tax function facing any individual taxpayer in the th bracket is
equivalent to a tax function with a marginal tax rate, , applied to income measured
in excess of an eﬀective threshold, ∗. An advantage of this tax function is that the
eﬀective threshold in (3) captures the revenue eﬀect of changes in any infra-marginal
tax rate,  , or threshold, ,   , changes, as well as any marginal changes, , or
.
7In this latter case, tax revenue,  (), refers to total tax revenue net of any tax credits and transfer
payments.
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2.2 Changes in Individual Tax Payments
Consider a change in the individual’s tax liability resulting from an exogenous increase
in one of the marginal tax rates, with other rates and the thresholds unchanged. This
gives rise to a behavioral response, so writing  () = , rearranging the total deriv-
ative,  =   +   , in elasticity form, using the general notation,  =   ,
gives:
 = 0 +  (4)
Here 0 =   denotes a partial elasticity. In the case where an income change does
not lead to a movement across an income threshold,  = 0.8 Equation (4) can be
rewritten in terms of the elasticity of taxable income, ETI, using 1− = −
¡
1−

¢  ,
such that:
 = 0 −
µ 
1− 
¶
1− (5)
The first term in (4) may be said to reflect a pure ‘tax rate’ eﬀect of a rate change,
with unchanged incomes, while the term after the minus sign captures the ‘tax base’
eﬀect, resulting from the incentive eﬀects on taxable income and the revenue con-
sequences of that income change. When discussing the eﬀect on total revenue of a
change in the top income tax rate, Saez et al. (2012, p. 5) refer to the tax rate eﬀect
as ‘mechanical’ and the second term as the ‘behavioral’ eﬀect respectively (they do not
discuss the separate role of the revenue elasticity in this context).
The individual revenue elasticity is:
 =

 − ∗  1 (6)
Hence, within each tax bracket (for which the marginal rate is fixed) the elasticity
declines as income increases. As an individual crosses an income threshold, the revenue
elasticity takes a discrete upward jump, before gradually declining again.
Hence the elasticity of revenue with respect to the marginal rate faced by an indi-
vidual in the th tax bracket is:9
8For a proportional tax structure, with constant average and marginal rate, , and where ¯ is
arithmetic mean income,  = ¯ + ¯ and in terms of elasticities,  = 1 + ¯, giving the result
mentioned in the introduction; namely, revenue is maximised where ¯ = −1.
9Equation (7) demonstrates some similarities with the Saez et al. (2009, p. 5) expression for the
aggregate revenue response to a change in the top marginal rate. Equation (7) provides a generalisation
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 = 0 −
µ 
 − ∗
¶µ 
1− 
¶
1− (7)
The first term, 0 is the positive mechanical eﬀect of the rate change, which diﬀer-
entiation of (2), and using (3), shows is:10
0 =
 ( − )
 () =
( − )
( − ∗) =
()
 () (8)
Individuals’ mechanical elasticities therefore diﬀer with their incomes and the tax struc-
ture, represented in (8) by diﬀerences between the th threshold, , and the th ef-
fective threshold, ∗. Furthermore, since ∗ is a tax-rate weighted average of all tax
thresholds up to and including the individual’s marginal tax rate/bracket, this eﬀective
threshold parameter enables the full mechanical revenue eﬀect to be captured when a
rate or threshold below the taxpayer’s marginal rate bracket is changed. As can be
seen in (7), it also features in the behavioral response component.
The second term in (7) combines the three elements that form the ‘behavioral eﬀect’.
It can be seen that this comprises, in addition to the ETI, two terms associated with
the tax structure and the individual’s income level. The behavioral eﬀect is larger the
larger is the individual’s ETI, the higher is  and the closer is the taxpayer’s income
to the eﬀective threshold. Each element after the minus sign in (7) is positive, and so
the overall behavioral response unambiguously reduces revenue.
In view of the importance of the closeness of  to the eﬀective income threshold,
∗, the following discussion refers to this as an ‘income-threshold’ eﬀect though this is
often referred to in the fiscal drag literature as a revenue elasticity.11
The components of (7) can readily be illustrated by considering the following ex-
ample in which taxpayers face a marginal tax rate of 20% on income above a threshold,
of the Saez et al. result to all marginal tax rates but applied to individuals. The expressions developed
in subsection 2.3 for aggregate responses avoid a specific income distribution assumption, whereas Saez
et al. (2009, p. 5) assume a Pareto distribution. The latter is less suitable for the whole distribution
of taxpayers than for those facing the top marginal rate.
10The partial individual elasticity, 0 , for    (that is, for changes in marginal tax rates below
the tax bracket in which the individual falls) is given by 0 = {  (+1 − )}  (), which is
simply the tax paid at the rate,   , divided by total tax paid by the individual.
11See, for example, Creedy and Gemmell (2002). This terminology also reduces the number of
references to elasticity measures. As    and 1 > 0, equation (7) is undefined for  = 0; hence
it cannot account for behavioural responses at the extensive margin such as where taxpayers exit the
taxpaying population in response to a tax rate change.
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, of $50,000. And suppose, for any taxpayer, a tax reform which raises their marginal
tax rate, , by 10%, also induces a 4% reduction in their taxable income. Then, for
a taxpayer earning $52,000, raising the 20% tax rate to 22% would induce a $2,000
reduction in their taxable income, to $50,000. Hence for this taxpayer all the previous
revenue raised at rate , would be eliminated (in addition to the mechanical revenue
increase equal to 2% of $2,000). That is, 100% of tax revenue previously raised at the
20% rate from this taxpayer would be lost when that rate rises to 22%.
By analogy, taxpayers with incomes prior to the tax reform greater than $50,000
would experience a less than 100% reduction in the tax revenue raised from them at
rate . Hence, given the above parameters and the 4% predicted responsiveness of
taxpayers, income equal to $52,000 turns out to be the income level at which all revenue
raised at rate , is lost due to reform. Of interest for present purposes is to assess
the degree of responsiveness for each taxpayer which yields a behavioral response to a
tax rate rise that exactly matches the induced mechanical tax revenue increase; that
is, the revenue-maximising elasticity of taxable income.
Denoting this revenue-maximizing elasticity of taxable income, ETI, by 1− ,
it can readily be obtained by setting the left-hand-side of (7) to zero to yield:12
1− = 
0

µ − ∗

¶µ
1− 

¶
(9)
An observed or estimated value greater than ETI implies that any increase in the
taxpayer’s marginal tax rate reduces income tax revenue from that taxpayer. From
(9), for a given value of individual income, ETI is lower when marginal tax rates are
higher and income tax thresholds are lower (bearing in mind that ∗ is a tax-rate-
weighted average of the s).
Furthermore, since the terms on the right hand side of (9) are multiplicative, and
0 
³−∗ ´  1, but ³1− ´ may be greater than one (for   05), the behavioral
components may act either to magnify or shrink the mechanical eﬀect in determining
the maximum ETI consistent with revenue maximization from the individual taxpayer.
Assessing the likely magnitudes of the revenue-maximizing elasticity requires esti-
12Fullerton (2008) gives the familiar revenue maximising tax rate for a proportional tax system, in
terms of the ETI, as 1/(1+ETI). Using (4), and setting 0 = 1 and ∗ = 0 for a proportional tax,
rearrangement of (4) gives the revenue maximising tax rate, , as  = ¡1 + 1−¢−1.
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mates of individual taxpayer’s mechanical eﬀects, 0 , which vary considerably across
individuals. Alternatively, using (8), the term 0
³−∗ ´ in (9) can be expressed as³− ´, whereby the only computational information required relates to the individ-
ual’s income, , and the highest tax threshold below , , and:
1− =
µ − 

¶µ
1− 

¶
(10)
Equation (7) can be used more generally to calculate maximum ETIs consistent
with any particular value of  , in addition to the specific revenue-maximizing case
of  = 0. For example, where tax revenue authorities wish to target a particular
revenue increase via raising one or more marginal tax rates, it is important to know
for which taxpayers or income groups this is likely to involve taxable income and/or
revenue reductions. Where  =   0 is targeted, (9) becomes:
1− = (
0
 − )
µ − ∗

¶µ
1− 

¶
(11)
where 1− denotes the maximum value consistent with the target  = . In
practice, if such a revenue target is set, it is likely to apply to aggregate revenue from
all taxpayers. Nevertheless, (11) confirms that ETI is expected to be less than the
revenue-maximizing elasticity (for   0). As (11) makes clear, as  tends to 0 (the
pure mechanical eﬀect), the maximum elasticity of taxable income consistent with this
tends to zero such that the full mechanical eﬀect is realised; see (7).
2.3 Aggregation over Individuals
To aggregate over individuals, first convert (7) into changes, rather than elasticities:

 =

 −
µ 
 − ∗
¶ 
 (1− )
µ

¶
(12)
Aggregating over  = 1   individuals who are in the th bracket:
X
=1

 =
X
=1

 −
X
=1
µ 
 − ∗
¶ 
 (1− )
µ

¶
(13)
Suppose it is required that the total change in revenue from an increase in the rate
 is 0. Furthermore, remembering that  =  ( − ∗):
X
=1

 = 
X
=1

 (1− ) (14)
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Hence:
1

X
=1

 =
P=1 
 (1− ) (15)
and writing
P=1  = , where 1− denotes the aggregate elasticity of taxable
income for which aggregate revenue is unchanged, it is seen that:
1− =
1

µ
1− 

¶ X
=1

 (16)
Using:

 =
µ



¶ 
 =

 
0 (17)
and substituting for 0 =
³ 
−∗
´³

1−
´
1− at maximum revenue, where
1− is the elasticity of taxable income for individual  below which an increase
in  produces an larger tax payment, it can be seen that:
1− =
X
=1
µ 

¶
1− (18)
Hence the aggregate elasticity of taxable income in the th tax bracket, such that
the revenue from the bracket at the given tax rate is a maximum, is an income-share
weighted average of individual elasticities. The above assumes that each individual
does not move into a lower tax bracket as a result of the tax rate increase.13
As with the elasticity expressions for individuals, the aggregate expression in (18)
includes revenue changes associated with infra-marginal taxpayers. This is captured via
each individual 1− , in which terms in ∗ appear and which, as noted above, includes
revnue raised at infra-marginal tax rates. For example, in a three rate tax system, an
increase in the middle rate raises revenue from those paying the top marginal rate but
without a marginal behavioral response.This is captured by the fact that an increase
in the middle tax rate raises the value of the tax-rate-weighted eﬀective theshold, ∗,
for all taxpayers for whom this middle tax rate is applicable either marginally or infra-
marginally; see equation (3).
13Under the same assumption, Saez et al. (2009, p. 4) show that the actual or estimated ETI for
the top tax bracket is an income-weighted average of ETIs for individuals in that bracket.
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3 US Individual Revenue-Maximizing ETIs
This section illustrates the revenue-maximizing elasticities of taxable income and their
components for individuals, under the US federal and state income tax systems. As
equations (9) and (11) reveal, calculating these elasticities requires information on only
the tax schedule and income levels, from which the mechanical and behavioral eﬀects
can be obtained.
Statutory marginal tax rates and thresholds associated with income tax schedules
are readily obtained and generally apply to all or most taxpayers. However, identifying
the eﬀective marginal tax rates (EMTRs) and thresholds applicable to specific taxpay-
ers is not straightforward. Taxpayers’ personal circumstances, such as marital and tax
filing status, numbers of children and dependents are important. When combined with
federal payroll taxes, state income taxes, and the eligibility rules around federal social
benefit programs, the outcome is typically a complex set of interactions that gener-
ate highly individual eﬀective marginal rates. These frequently display the familiar
‘Manhattan skyline’ pattern of rising and falling marginal rates as income levels rise.
Fortunately for present purposes, the Congressional Budget Oﬃce (CBO, 2005)
has examined EMTRs for US income taxpayers by filing status across a wide range of
taxable income levels in 2005. These include federal, state and payroll taxes (for Social
Security and Medicare). CBO (2012) reports on a similar exercise using 2012 data
but only for low-to-moderate income level individuals − up to $50,000 ($100,000) for
single (married) filers − which also covers a range of income-contingent federal transfer
payments.
Based on data fromCBO (2005), this section reports illustrative revenue-maximizing
elasticities of taxable income, ETI, for taxable income levels up to $0.5 million, for
three taxpayer types: Single (no children); Married (with 2 children) filing jointly; Head
of Household (with one child). Subsection 3.1 first illustrates ETIs for the statutory
federal income tax schedule. Subsection 3.2 considers the eﬀect on these ETIs of
the various deductions etc associated with diﬀerent taxpayer types and income levels.
Subsection 3.3 shows the impact of adding state and payroll taxes.
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3.1 Revenue-Maximizing ETIs: Statutory Tax Schedule
Table 1 shows the statutory marginal tax rates and taxable income thresholds for a
single filer in 2005. The final column of the table reports the eﬀective income threshold,
∗, for each income bracket, using equation (3).
Table 1: Statutory Federal Income Tax Structure: Single Filer 2005
Income threshold Tax rate Eﬀective threshold
   ∗
1 0 0.10 0
2 7,300 0.15 2434
3 29,700 0.25 13340
4 71,950 0.28 19620
5 150,150 0.33 38844
6 326,450 0.35 55800
Using equation (10), together with the data in Table 1, yields a schedule of values
for ETI at each income level for this taxpayer type, as shown in the top panel of Figure
1. The interpretation of these ETI values is as follows. At each taxable income level,
an actual or estimated ETI greater than the value shown implies that a cut in the
applicable marginal tax rate would yield an increase in revenue, and vice versa. That
is, the behavioral eﬀect outweighs the mechanical eﬀect.
Figure 1 shows that, except at very low incomes, ETIs are generally below two and,
importantly, are very low for taxpayers above but close to each threshold. For a tax-
payer marginally above a particular threshold, any positive ETI generates an increase
in revenue in response to a cut in the marginal rate applicable above that threshold.14
At very low incomes the ETI is 9.0 — obtained from −1 = 1; 1 = 0; and  1 = 010
hence
³
1−11
´
= 9. Though such high values imply that it is almost impossible for
the behavioral eﬀect to outweigh the mechanical eﬀect, it must be remembered that
these results do not apply to the extensive margin. In addition, to the extent that such
extensive margin responses are driven by average, rather than marginal, tax rates, the
appropriate response elasticity will be diﬀerent from the (marginal) ETI used here.
14It is assumed here that individuals do not cross thresholds. Hence, for a taxpayer with income
just above  facing an increase in the marginal rate above , a positive ETI would shift the taxpayer
to the tax bracket below, where the relevant ETI is much larger.
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Figure 1: Revenue-Maximizing ETIs: Statutory Income Tax Schedule
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The bottom panel of Figure 1 shows values for the two components on the right-
hand-side of (10) across income levels. These are (−) — the combined mechanical
eﬀect, () (), and income-threshold eﬀect,  ( − ∗); and the tax rate eﬀect,
(1− ) . Not surprisingly, the tax rate eﬀect falls with the increasing marginal
rate structure of the schedule, from 9 for  = 1 to less than 2 (= 065035) for  = 6.
With a top marginal rate of 0.35, the tax rate eﬀect is relatively modest for higher
income US taxpayers compared with values that might be expected in other countries
with higher top tax rates.
An important feature of both panels in Figure 1, is that the introduction of a new
top tax bracket (and marginal rate), or a new marginal rate elsewhere in the schedule,
creates a new segment of the profile where ETI is lower than previously — and zero at
the new threshold. For taxpayers paying the initial top tax rate this can be important
since the ETI profile rises steadily towards an asymptote of (1− )  above the
top threshold. Hence the introduction of a new threshold at very high income levels
(where actual ETIs are often estimated to be higher) could generate much lower ETIs
for those taxpayers above the new threshold.
For example, a new top tax rate of 0.40 on taxable incomes above $400,000 would
reduce the ETIs for taxpayers close to but above this threshold, whilst raising it for
taxpayers on much higher incomes because the new asymptote of (1− )  is now
greater. Hence whether revenue reductions are expected from this top tax rate increase
depends on the distribution of taxpayers above $400,000 and, empirical estimates based
on samples of taxpayers will depend on which specific taxpayers are sampled.
3.2 Revenue-Maximizing ETIs: Federal Income Tax and Fil-
ing Status
As CBO (2005, 2012) demonstrate, the itemized deductions, tax credits and phase-
out, or abatement, rates of the US Federal income tax system, together with diﬀering
statutory thresholds and rates associated with each tax filing status, lead to widely
diﬀering eﬀective marginal tax rates across income levels and taxpayers. Figure 2,
from CBO (2005, p. 15) for example, shows how these vary for a married taxpayer
with two children, under a number of simplifying assumptions.15
15For example: all income is from employment; taxpayers have itemized deductions equal to 18
percent of their earnings; 40% of the deductions are state and local taxes (not deductible under the
14
In addition to substantial diﬀerences between the EMTRs and statutory marginal
rates at various income levels, EMTRs fall in some cases as income increases. The
addition of state and payroll taxes to those shown (see CBO, 2005, pp.16-19) fur-
ther complicates these schedules of EMTRs, raising them in general but also creating
additional income ranges over which EMTRs fall.16
The data in Figure 2, and equivalent CBO (2005) data for a single filer (no chil-
dren) and a head of household filer (one child), allow revenue-maximizing ETIs to be
constructed for those illustrative taxpayers. The resulting profiles of ETIs across in-
come levels for single, married (filing jointly), and head of household (HoH) filers are
shown in Figures 3, 4 and 5 respectively, where the income ranges $0—100 000 and
$100 000—500 000 are shown separately. Diﬀerent scales are used on the vertical axes
of the upper and lower panels of each Figure, and in Figure 3, the ETIs for single
filers are compared with the statutory case. According to IRS data for 2005, these
three taxpayer types made up 98% of total taxable returns (single = 23.7%; married
filing jointly = 69.6%; HoH = 4.6%).17
In all three figures, ETIs at low income levels (under about $20,000) can take very
large negative or positive values.18 As stressed earlier, these very low income ETIs
are of limited relevance here in view of the potential importance of adjustments at the
extensive margin to tax rate changes at these lower income levels. Nevertheless, they
emphasize that the potential for perverse responses to tax rate changes at these lower
income levels - very large positive or negative behavioral responses to tax rate changes
could have surprising eﬀects on revenues, given the volatility of ETIs in this region
where EMTRs fluctuate around zero.
In the case of a single filer, Figure 3 also shows that, compared to ETIs associated
with the statutory tax schedule, the profile of ETIs is generally shifted rightward, at
Alternative Minimum Tax) and the other 60% are charitable contributions and mortgage interest
(deductible under the AMT). CBO includes only some of the most common features of the tax code
in the examples.
16In the CBO (2005) analysis, and that which follows, payroll tax rates include both employers’
and empoyees’ contributions. State income taxes are simplified, with a uniform 5 percent rate added
to the federal rate, which ‘approximates the marginal rate in an average state’ (CBO, 2005, p. 16).
See CBO (2005) for more details on the specific taxpayer and schedule characteristics assumed.
17Remaining return types are married filing separately (2.0%) and surviving spouses (0.05%): See
http://www.irs.gov/uac/SOI-Tax-Stats–Individual-Statistical-Tables-by-Filing-Status
18The axes have been truncated but there are singularities in the ETI profiles when EMTRs equal
zero and values can reach as low as −14 in Figure 3.
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Figure 2: Eﬀective Marginal Federal Income Tax Rates for a Married Couple with Two
Children in 2005
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Figure 3: Revenue-Maximizing ETIs - Single Filer
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Figure 4: Revenue-Maximizing ETIs - Married Filer
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Figure 5: Revenue-Maximizing ETIs - HoH Filer
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least below $100,000. As a result, those taxpayers with relatively high or low ETIs are
very diﬀerent under the two regimes. However, above $100,000 Figure 3 reveals that
most single filers face much lower ETIs than would be inferred from the statutory
schedule. This arises primarily from the series of additional thresholds and EMTRs
associated with the phase-outs of various deductions and exemptions.19 Importantly,
ETIs for single filers with incomes above around $100,000 are typically in the 0—05
region. These are also plausible values for actual ETIs.
For married, jointly-filing taxpayers with two children, Figure 4 reveals a similar
pattern to Figure 3, with values around 0—3 at incomes below $100,000, but 0—05 above
$100,000.20. As in the single taxpayer case, these values suggest that taxpayers’ precise
location along the income scale is critically important for revenue responses to tax rate
changes. At the aggregate level (see below) it becomes important to know where most
taxpayers are located. Finally, Figure 5, for a head of household filer, displays similar
features to the others but two significant diﬀerences. Above around $100,000 the ETI
profile peaks at higher values of around 08—09, but below $100,000 ETI values are
generally lower than for other taxpayer types. For example an HoH filer reaches an
ETI local maximum of 049 at $95,000, whereas the equivalent maximum for a single
or married taxpayer at around $90,000 is 17 (single), and 33 (married).
3.3 Adding State and Payroll Taxes
Adding the impact of state and payroll taxes to EMTRs, CBO (2005) show that, as
expected, this raises EMTRs across a range of incomes. Of course, these vary across
states; the CBO analysis necessarily makes a number of simplifying assumptions such as
that the employee bears the burden of both the employees’ and employers’ contributions
and state taxes are simplified by a uniform 5% rate added to relevant federal Income
Tax EMTRs, based on the federal measure of taxable income.21
19See CBO (2005, p.12). These higher income phase-outs include the Alternative Minimum Tax
(AMT), itemized deduction and personal exemption phase-outs (and the EITC at lower income levels).
20Profiles for married taxpayers with more or fewer children would look similar but with the discrete
‘cliﬀs’ in the profiles at diﬀerent income levels.
21See CBO (2005, pp. 16-19) for details of the approach and results. Reed et al (2011) provide
an alternative revenue-based regression approach to estimate EMTRs for all state-level taxes. Their
estimates suggest an average state income tax EMTRs around 2.5% though their personal income
measure is broader (hence their EMTRs are lower, other things equal) than the taxable income used
by CBO (2005).
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Figure 6: Revenue-Maximizing ETIs Including Payroll & State Taxes - Married Filer
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Figure 6 illustrates the impact of payroll and state income taxes on the ETI profile
across income levels, based on a married taxpayer with two children, filing jointly. The
broken line is the federal income tax case from Figure 4, with the unbroken line showing
ETIs inclusive of payroll and state income taxes. While the downward shift in ETI
for income over $100,00 is modest but non-trivial, the downward shift for incomes below
$100,000 is substantial. For incomes between about $37,000 and $90,000, for example,
the maximum ETI becomes 077 instead of 325 which is obtained when ignoring
payroll and state taxes. The average ETIs over that income range are respectively
041 and 201 for the with, and without, payroll and state tax cases. Recognizing the
impact of these payroll and state income taxes is therefore likely to be important when
assessing how close observed elasticities are to those that would maximize revenue from
these taxpayers. The further eﬀects of means-tested transfers are examined briefly in
the Appendix.
The revenue-maximizing elasticities of taxable income considered in this section
are purely illustrative for particular household types. However, they all appear to have
ranges of incomes − sometimes several short income ranges and sometimes fewer but
wider ranges − over which ETIs are relatively low. Whether this is likely to generate
revenue reductions in aggregate in response to EMTR increases depends on the weight
of those and other taxpayers in the overall distribution of taxable incomes. This is
examined in the following section.
4 Aggregate Values of ETI
Calculation of an aggregate ETI across the US taxpaying population, or sub-sets of
taxpayers such as those within individual statutory rate tax brackets, requires detailed
data on the number and personal characteristics of the relevant taxpayers, which is
beyond the scope of the present analysis. Nevertheless, this section illustrates likely
orders of magnitude by combining ETI information on the individual taxpayer types
examined above with IRS data on the distribution of US personal incomes.
Using 2005 data on US adjusted gross incomes (AGI) and taxable incomes from
taxable returns filed with the IRS, Table 2 shows the share in total taxable income
(both within taxpayer types, and across all three types: married filing jointly, head of
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household, and single).22 Summing the rows, the table shows, for example, in column
2 that among married joint-filers, less than 5% of taxable income is earned by M-J
taxpayers with AGI below $50,000; around 70% of M-J taxable income is earned by
taxpayers with AGI over $100,000 and almost 30% from those with AGI over $500,000
(which also accounts for around 20% of all taxable income; see column 3).23 Equivalent
percentages for single filers are lower, at 59%, 31% and 14%. To explore the impact
of these distributions on ETI values requires taxable-income-weighted averages of
individual ETIs as shown in section 2.3, which in turn requires taxpayer unit record
data to identify values of , , ∗ and  for each taxpayer.
Table 2: Income shares by Taxable Income Band
Married-Joint Head of H’hold Single Total
Income shares Income shares Income shares
AGI % M-J % all % HoH % all % S % all % all
($000s) income income income income income income income
$20− 25 0.1 0.1 1.0 0 4.9 1.2 1.3
$25− 30 0.3 0.2 3.4 0.2 6.0 1.5 1.8
$30− 40 1.3 0.9 14.4 0.7 12.5 3.0 4.6
$40− 50 2.5 1.8 15.6 0.7 11.3 2.7 5.3
$50− 75 11.9 8.4 26.3 1.2 18.8 4.6 14.2
$75− 100 13.8 9.8 10.7 0.5 8.9 2.2 12.4
$100− 200 25.4 18.1 11.4 0.5 10.9 2.6 21.2
$200− 500 15.9 11.3 6.1 0.3 6.8 1.6 13.2
$500− 1 000 7.5 5.4 3.0 0.1 3.2 0.8 6.3
 $1 000 21.3 15.1 7.7 0.4 10.3 2.5 18.0
100 71 100 5 100 24 100
In the absence of this level of detail, values of ETI within each AGI band are
obtained as unweighted averages of ETIs for each taxpayer type, based on the data
underlying Figures 3 to 5. These are shown in Table 3 for ETIs based on federal-
only and federal plus payroll and state income taxes. With only three taxpayer types
22To save space, this table, and the next one, focus on taxpayers with AGI in excess of $20,000. As
noted earlier, the ETI estimates probably have limited relevance for taxpayers on lower incomes. In
any case, those with incomes below $20,000 represent a small fraction of total AGI or taxable income.
23Equivalent percentages for numbers of married-joint taxpayers in 2005 are, of course, much
smaller, at 23% below taxable income of $50,000; 30% with taxable income above $100,000 and 1.7%
above $500,000.
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involving specific assumptions regarding numbers of children and so on, these ETIs do
not capture the full heterogeneity in individual ETIs. However, the diﬀerences within
broad filing types lead to diﬀerent thresholds at which the various EMTRs apply rather
than substantially altering EMTR values. The ETIs in Table 3 do capture the major
source of diﬀerences in ETIs across individuals, namely the impact of diﬀerent eﬀective
thresholds along the income scale.
For example, for AGI over $20,000 − where ETIs are more readily interpreted −
Table 3 shows that unweighted average values within each income band, and across
filer types, are often quite low (less than 1 or less than 05).This is especially true when
payroll and state taxes are included. For top earners − AGI in excess of $1 million
in this case − the values shown in Table 3 are based on the ETI applicable to the
individual with average income in this income band.24 As noted earlier, as incomes rise
above $1 million, these ETIs approach (1− ), where  is the highest EMTR
faced by this taxpayer; that is, for  = 035, ETI approaches 186, though for many
high income taxpayers EMTRs exceed 35%. For married joint filers, for example, CBO
(2005) estimates a top EMTR (including payroll and state taxes) of 0.43, implying an
asymptotic ETI = 133. Using the taxable income shares in Table 2 it is possible to
obtain weighted average ETIs across AGI levels for each of the three filer types shown
and all three filer groups combined. Table 4 shows these estimates based on all income
bands and also for incomes above $20,000.25
Focussing attention on the largest taxpayer groups − married joint filers (M-J) and
single (S) filers − Table 4 suggests ETIs around 0.97 for M-J and 2.7 for singles.
Ignoring those with incomes below $20,000 has almost no eﬀect on the M-J group
(AGI less than $20,000 is almost an empty set here; see Table 2) while for Singles,
ETI = 127 when low incomes are excluded. These values drop considerably when
payroll and state taxes are added, such that the weighted average ETIs become 044
(M-J) and 048 (S). Over all three taxpayer groups, ETI is around 103—140 (federal
tax only) and 044 (including payroll and state taxes).
These values can provide illustrative orders of magnitude only, but they are sug-
24From IRS data for 2005 these are around $2.9 million for a married joint filer and $3.1 million for
a single filer.
25As shown above, ETIs for incomes below $20,000 tend to be highly volatile and arguably are of
limited relevance here.
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Table 3: ETIs by Taxable Income Band
Married-Joint (M-J) Head of H’hold (HoH) Single (S)
AGI ETI ETI ETI ETI ETI ETI
($000s) Fed. FPS Fed. FPS Fed. FPS
$20− 25 29 05 06 03 18 06
$25− 30 03 01 03 01 25 05
$30− 40 05 02 07 02 31 04
$40− 50 09 03 17 02 03 02
$50− 75 22 04 09 03 10 05
$75− 100 17 04 02 01 11 05
$100− 200 02 02 04 03 04 03
$200− 500 04 03 03 02 02 02
$500− 1 000 01 00 03 02 04 03
 $1 000 15 11 15 12 16 12
Fed. = Federal income tax only;
FPS = Federal, payroll and state income taxes
Table 4: Weighted Average Revenue Maximising ETIs
Filer Group: M-J HoH S Total
Income share: 71% 5% 24% 100%
Weighted ETI:
Fed. only (  0) 0.97 1.02 2.72 1.40
Fed. only (y>$20k) 0.97 0.83 1.27 1.03
Fed.+Pay.+State (  0) 0.44 0.31 0.48 0.44
Fed.+Pay.+State (y>$20k) 0.43 0.31 0.48 0.44
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gestive of an overall federal income tax system that probably involves tax rates that
are still on the revenue-increasing side of the Laﬀer curve. Though some people might
argue for ETIs greater than 10 or 14 for some high income taxpayers, few would claim
that these values apply across the taxpaying population.26 The same argument prob-
ably applies, but with less force, for ETIs including payroll and state taxes. Values
around 044, are within the range of plausible values for actual ETIs estimated from
US taxpayer data, but again such estimates are not generally based on representative
samples of all taxpayers. Nevertheless, these weighted ETI values around 04 are
suﬃciently low as to suggest some caution is warranted before concluding that the US
income tax is ‘well below’ a revenue-maximizing structure, even if this is the case for
the highest income taxpayers. More detailed analysis of ETIs based on large samples
of individual taxpayers at diﬀerent income levels would provide more confidence around
such estimates.
5 The Revenue-Maximizing Tax Rate
As mentioned in section 2, Fullerton (2008) discusses the derivation of the revenue
maximizing tax rate for a proportional income tax. Saez et al. (2012, p. 6) derive an
analogous expression for the top tax rate which maximizes revenue from taxpayers in
the top income tax bracket, which Giertz (2009b) applies to US IRS data. Equivalent
expressions are also easily obtained for the multi-rate system by setting the change in
revenue in (7) to zero and rearranging to give the revenue-maximizing tax rate,  , in
terms of a given elasticity of taxable income (instead of the revenue-maximizing ETI
corresponding to a given value of ). Hence:
 =
"µ 
( − ∗)
¶Ã1−
0
!
+ 1
#−1
(19)
26See, for example, Weber (2011, 2012). Saez et al (2012) argue that a plausible range of ETI values
is between 0.1 and 0.4. However, Weber (2011) obtains ETI estimates around 1.0 from examining US
tax reform, mainly TRA86, over 1979-90 using a sample from the Michigan IRS Tax Panel which, she
claims, does not over-sample high income individuals; see Weber, 2011, p.11). Nevertheless, as Weber
acknowledges, higher income individuals were most aﬀected by the TRA86 reforms.
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Figure 7: Revenue-Maximizing Tax Rates
Substituting for the mechanical elasticity in (19) using 0 = (−)(−∗) from (8), further
rearrangement shows that:
 = ( − )(1 + 1−)− 
(20)
For a proportional income tax, where  = ∗ = 0, equation (20) yields the Fullerton
special case of  = 1(1 + 1−).27
Figure 7 shows values of  using (20) for the statutory federal income tax based
on five ETI values in the range 02—10. In addition to  rising as incomes increase
above each tax threshold, these profiles also tend to shift downwards in successively
higher tax brackets.
Similar profiles can be created using the eﬀective marginal rate structure and tax-
payer types analysed above. Figure 8 shows the equivalent case for a single filer (with
no children) based on the EMTRs and thresholds of the federal plus payroll and state
27The Saez et al. expression for the revenue-maximising top tax rate is given by  = (1 +1− )−1, where  is a measure of average income in the top bracket relative to the top threshold
income. It can be shown that this is equivalent to equation (20), where, in the present case,  =
 ( − ), for    .
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Figure 8: Revenue-Maximizing Tax Rate for Single Filer (No Children)
tax regime described above. Income values up to $100,000 are shown for clarity, but
the profiles follow a similar pattern as incomes increase further. It can be seen that
the revenue-maximizing tax rate for any individual varies considerably across taxpayer
incomes but is also highly variable depending on the assumed value of the ETI. Ac-
cording to IRS data, average taxable income for single-filing taxpayers (with positive
taxable income) in 2005 was around $28,000. It can be seen that  around this income
level is in a very unstable range.
Given volatilities around specific taxable income levels, Table 5 shows revenue-
maximizing tax rates for single filing taxpayers associated with the average reported
taxable income within each of the AGI bands examined above. These are shown for
assumed ETIs of 0.2 and 1.0, with the relevant 2005 statutory federal MTRs, and
combined federal-payroll-state EMTRs for a single filer (no children) in the two right-
hand columns. It can be seen that, although the statutory rate is well below the
revenue-maximizing rate when ETI = 02 is assumed, this is not always the case when
comparing with the EMTRs, especially at higher income levels. Also, based on a much
higher ETI = 10, there are some cases where the revenue-maximizing rate appears to
be below the observed statutory MTR and/or the EMTR.
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These numbers should be treated cautiously. Revenue-maximizing tax rates are
not a linear function of average taxable income, as Figure 8 makes clear. In addition,
it is unclear how far taxpayers respond to these estimated eﬀective marginal rates
(including payroll and state taxes) or the statutory rates shown. However the results
in Table 5 highlight two important properties. Firstly, that the issue of how revenue-
maximizing tax rates compare to observed rates needs to be considered carefully across
the complete tax schedule, not merely at the top end, and for specific taxpayer types.
Secondly, for the highest incomes (in excess of $1 million), revenue-maximizing tax
rates appear to be relatively high (at around 47-81% using the ETI range shown),
and possibly well above generally observed top tax rates.28 However, it is much less
clear that the outcome for top rate taxpayers earning below $1 million puts them ‘well
below’ the Laﬀer maximum rate.
Table 5: Revenue Maximising Tax Rates by AGI Bands: Single Filer
AGI Average TI† Rev-Maximizing Tax Rate (%) Statutory Single-filer
($000s) ($) (ETI = 02) (ETI = 10) MTR EMTR*
 $5 1,025 83 50 0 7
$5− 10 1,902 83 50 0 7
$10− 15 4,445 83 50 0 7
$15− 20 8,771 25 6 10 35
$20− 25 13,356 37 10 10 28
$25− 30 17,983 41 12 15 33
$30− 40 24,200 64 26 15 33
$40− 50 32,722 43 13 15 32
$50− 75 45,249 36 10 25 41
$75− 100 66,236 66 28 25 41
$100− 200 105,313 39 11 28 34
$200− 500 245,182 55 20 33 40
$500− 1 000 595,114 63 26 35 42
 $1 000 3,122,202 81 47 35 42
† TI = taxable income; * EMTR at average TI within each AGI band.
The estimates in Table 5 may be compared with similar values estimated for 
by Giertz (2009b). Based on the 2005 income tax, including federal, payroll and state
28Recall also that the EMTRs shown relate to labor income. To the extent that higher income
taxpayers earn greater amounts of capital income, which generally face lower tax rates, the EMTRs
shown will exaggerate the relevant EMTRs.
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taxes, Giertz estimated  for five assumed values of the elasticity of taxable income
between 02 and 10. These are shown, for the top tax bracket (for which comparisons
are most readily made) in Table 6 along with the equivalent values from the analysis in
this paper. Giertz (2009b) estimates would appear to include all single filers in the top
tax bracket in 2005; that is, those with incomes above $326 450. The most relevant
comparison is based on the two highest income brackets in the IRS data in Table 5;
that is, income in excess of $500 000.29
Table 6: Revenue Maximising Tax Rates: Comparisons with Giertz (2009b)
Top Tax Bracket Revenue-Maximizing Tax Rate,  (%)
ETI:
Income above: Source: 02 04 06 08 10
$326 450 Giertz (2009b) 78 63 53 46 41
$500 000 this paper 79 65 56 48 43
As the table demonstrates, the Giertz revenue-maximizing top tax rate estimates
are very close to those obtained here for each ETI assumed value. The Giertz (2009b)
values are slightly smaller, as would be expected since ETIs for taxpayers between
$326 450 and $500 000 have been shown earlier to be among the lowest within the
top tax bracket and serve to reduce the Giertz estimates relative to those calculated
for taxpayer incomes over $500 000. As Giertz (2009b) argues, with an actual top
tax bracket EMTR of approximately 41%, ETIs around 10 or greater imply that it is
above the revenue-maximizing rate.
6 Conclusions
Recent empirical literature on the elasticity of taxable income (ETI) has been concerned
with whether an estimated ETI is likely to exceed a threshold value consistent with the
revenue-maximizing point on the Laﬀer curve. This has been explored in the context
of a single marginal rate system or with respect to the top marginal rate only. For
multi-rate income tax systems commonly used in practice, this paper has developed
expressions for the revenue-maximizing elasticity, ETI. It has shown both that values
29Since the next highest income group reported in the IRS data is $200,00 - $500,000, a reliable
split of the class data into above/below the top tax threshold is not possible here.
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of ETI can be expected to vary widely within and across income tax brackets, and
that approximations based on a proportional income tax, or top marginal rate, are
likely to be highly inaccurate. Expressions for the ETI in a multi-rate income tax
are composed of three elements: a mechanical eﬀect, an income threshold eﬀect and a
tax rate eﬀect. Each element varies across taxpayers within a given tax structure and
across tax structures. They are highly sensitive to the number and frequency of tax
rates and thresholds. The approach was also used to derive the associated revenue-
maximizing tax rate,  , for individual taxpayers within each income bracket and in
aggregate.
Illustrating values for the revenue-maximizing ETIs, for individuals and groups
of taxpayers, based on the US income tax system in 2005 suggests that revenue-
maximizing ETIs for individual taxpayers take very diﬀerent values depending on their
personal tax filing and family characteristics, the structure of eﬀective tax rates and
thresholds, and their income levels. As a result, it can be expected that, for a given ac-
tual elasticity of taxable income, the prospect that this exceeds the revenue-maximizing
value is very diﬀerent across taxpayers, with ETIs being especially low for those tax-
payers above but close to EMTR thresholds. ETIs for groups of taxpayers are also
therefore likely to be highly dependent on which taxpayers are included in a sample,
their income and other characteristics.
Whether revenue-maximization occurs in aggregate clearly depends on the balance
of these individual revenue-reducing and revenue-enhancing responses by diﬀerent tax-
payers. Examining ETIs for illustrative groups of taxpayers using IRS data on the
distribution of taxable income across AGI bands suggests that they can also be very
diﬀerent across diﬀerent income groups, and again depend on taxpayers’ filing status,
family characteristics and so on. Though many of the aggregate estimates obtained
here can be relatively high − consistent with an income tax system having rates gener-
ally below revenue-maximising levels − this may not be the case for significant sub-sets
of taxpayers across a range of income levels.
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Appendix: The Eﬀects of Means-Tested Transfers
Data from CBO (2012) allow examination of the eﬀect of adding the phasing-in or
out of means-tested transfers to the previous analysis. However, this is for the 2012
tax regimes rather than 2005, and only for lower income levels (up to $100,000 for
married joint filers and $50,000 for single filers). CBO (2012) examined EMTRs for
the hypothetical case of a single parent with one child, eligible for a number of family,
housing and health insurance transfers; see CBO (2012a, p. iv).30 Such taxpayers are
more likely to be in receipt of means-tested transfers. Equivalent EMTRs for married
couples with two children and single taxpayers with no children are considered in CBO
(2012b), which provides more details of simplifying assumptions.
Figure 9 shows the cases of a single taxpayer with no children and a married couple
with two children, both of whom receive eligible transfers. The higher EMTRs, caused
by transfer phase-out, produce ETIs that display very low values over a range of
incomes. For the single individual with no children, this range is approximately from
$6000 to $23,000, while for a married couple with two children it is from about $13,000
to $50,000 or more. In these cases ETI values generally lie below 02, and often well
below. To the extent that the EMTRs associated with withdrawal of transfers, as well
as the eﬀects of payroll taxes are salient to those taxpayers, the relatively lower ETIs
suggest the possibility that actual elasticities may not need to be high for reactions
by such taxpayers to be revenue-reducing, or at least involve large behavioral eﬀects
relative to mechanical eﬀects.
30CBO examined disposable income of a hypothetical single parent with one child, assuming that,
when eligible, it would receive Temporary Assistance for Needy Families, the Housing Choice Voucher
Program, SNAP, and either Medicaid or the Children’s Health Insurance Program (CHIP). Only
income from employment was considered.
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Figure 9: Revenue-Maximizing ETIs Including Transfers: 2012
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